How should we understand the following passages? [W]e are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.' Customary international law is federal law, to be enunciated authoritatively by the federal courts. 
How should we understand the following passages? [W] e are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.' Customary international law is federal law, to be enunciated authoritatively by the federal courts. International human rights cases predictably raise legal issues -such as interpretations of international law -that are matters of Federal common law and within the particular expertise of Federal courts. 3 Taking these passages at face value, most readers would understand them to mean just what they say: judicial determinations of international law -including international human rights law -are matters of federal law. That these three declarations emanate from the existence in the federal courts independent of acts of Congress." 9 By I98i, the Supreme Court had come unanimously to "recogniz[e] the need and authority in some limited areas to formulate what has come to be known as 'federal common law"' in cases in which "a federal rule of decision is 'necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,"' including "international disputes implicating ... our relations with foreign nations. "' 0 There matters stood until the last volume of this Law Review, when Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith launched an energetic assault upon this body of settled law." In Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, Bradley and Goldsmith argue that the "ascendancy of CIL [their term for customary international law] to the status of federal common law" is of recent vintage.1 2 The federalization of customary international law, they claim, stems not from traditional constitutional concerns about supremacy, uniformity, and the federal interest in international affairs, but rather from "a combination of troubling developments, including mistaken interpretations of history, doctrinal bootstrapping by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, and academic fiat."'1 3 Moreover, they claim, the so-called "modern position" conjured by this academic hijacking operation "depart[s] from well-accepted notions of American representative democracy, federal common law, separation of powers, and federalism. L. REV. 819 (1989) .
10 Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 64o-41 (ig8i) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964) Bradley and Goldsmith's position is not entirely novel, 16 and their democracy talk may have superficial appeal for those not well steeped in the fields of international and foreign affairs law. Their antijudicial-activism rhetoric makes for lively and provocative reading, which may account for the academic attention their piece has already attracted. 17 But even casual reflection compels the conclusion that Bradley and Goldsmith are utterly mistaken.
This Commentary evaluates Bradley and Goldsmith's challenge and demonstrates that it fails on its own terms. Under each of the authors' stated criteria -history and doctrine, separation of powers, federalism, and democratic values' 8 -their position is untenable and certainly far less credible than the traditional view they assail. Even cursory review makes clear that Bradley and Goldsmith have proposed a rather startling nonsolution to a nonproblem. For under current practice, federal courts regularly incorporate norms of customary international law into federal law. Bradley and Goldsmith urge instead a rule whereby "federal courts should not apply [customary international law] as federal law without some authorization to do so by the federal political branches." 9 As we shall see, their rule would foster none of the values that they favor. Instead, their proposal would oust a sensible, settled rule that all three federal branches and the fifty states have consistently followed in favor of a muddled notion that offers only an invitation to chaos.
I. BRADLEY AND GOLDSMITH'S PROPOSAL
Bradley and Goldsmith's initial article spends so much time attacking the settled view that customary international law is federal law that it leaves unclear precisely what their alternative might be. Given our three-tiered hierarchy of constitutional, federal, and state law, one might reasonably deduce that if international law is neither constitutional nor federal law, it must be state law, that is, rules of customary international law may be remade selectively by state legislatures and common law decisions. 20 Yet Bradley and Goldsmith's most recent writing denies that their view "require [s] that CIL be a matter of state common law." 2 1 Instead, they claim, "in most cases, states would rarely incorporate CIL into state law" and thus " [i] n this circumstance, CIL simply would not be a rule of decision in federal court." 22 Thus unveiled, the Bradley and Goldsmith position emerges as even more radical than it first appears. For if customary international law is neither federal nor state law (unless specifically incorporated by the state or federal political branches), then in most cases, customary international law is not United States law at all! In effect, Bradley and Goldsmith argue for the near complete ouster of customary international law rules from federal judicial interpretation. Yet such a position would utterly violate " [tihe Framers' Constitution[, which] anticipated that international disputes would regularly come before the United States courts and that the decisions in those cases could rest on principles of international law, without any necessary reference to the common law or to constitutional doctrines." 23 At a minimum, one would expect substantial policy justification before such a dramatic reversal of settled doctrine could be asserted by "academic fiat." Yet Bradley and Goldsmith mount virtually no arguments explaining why fifty state courts and legislatures should be free to reject, modify, reinterpret, selectively incorporate, or completely oust customary international law rules from domestic law. Under Bradley and Goldsmith's view, absent an explicit and unambiguous directive from a federal statute or treaty, state courts or legislatures could simply refuse to incorporate into state law customary international rules regarding the non-execution of pregnant women 2 4 or the 20 Cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 87o ("If a state chooses to incorporate CIL into state law, then the federal courts would be bound to apply the state interpretation of CIL on issues not otherwise governed by federal law. If a state did not, in fact, incorporate CI. into state law, the federal court would not be authorized to apply CIL as federal or state law."). 21 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 15, at 349. 22 . 23 White, supra note 8, at 727. Moreover, by advocating the elimination of customary international law as a rule of decision in this country, Bradley and Goldsmith propose to nullify the Supreme Court's century-old pronouncement that "[ilnternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (emphasis added).
24 Article 1(2) of the Senate's reservation to its advice and consent to ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 U.N. T.S. 171 (Dec. ig, 1966) , purports to preserve the discretion of the United States to impose capital punishment on any duly convicted person "other than a pregnant woman." Reservation No. 1, 138 CONG. REC. S 4 78 3 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992 ). Yet another statement attached by the Senate "declares that the provisions of Articles i through 27 of the Covenant [including Article 6.5, the relevant right-to-life provision of the Covenant] are not self-executing." Declaration No. i, 138 CONG. REC. S4784 (1992 (1985) (discussing the origins of federal common law in the context of political history); Koh, supra note 3o, at 2351-58 (discussing the evolution of American courts' treatment of the law of nations).
33 Admiralty, maritime, and prize cases were heard in federal jurisdiction under the predecessor statute to 28 U. S.C. § 1333 (1994) . Alien tort cases were heard under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), now codified at 28 U.S. REv. 221, 231-37 (1996) . ii, PART IX-c: THE LAW OF MARITIME PRIZE (1992). As Bederman explains, "from time immemorial, when a national court adjudicated a case of a maritime capture it was obliged to follow international law." Id. at 51.
be interpreted by federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction. 3 5 Thereafter, federal courts construed both commercial and noncommercial rules of customary international law so regularly that Justice Gray provoked no dissent when he wrote: "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."
36
There matters stood until Erie, in which Justice Brandeis famously invoked federalism concerns to pronounce that " [t] here is no federal general common law." 3 7 Curiously, Bradley and Goldsmith read Erie as effecting a near complete ouster of federal courts from their traditional role in construing customary international law norms. But nothing in Justice Brandeis's opinion suggests that he intended to unseat more than a century of settled law on that question.
Erie held that the grant of diversity jurisdiction, standing alone, did not authorize the federal courts to make a general federal common law of tort. 38 But customary international law differs from the state tort law at issue in Erie in at least three crucial respects. First, Justice Brandeis claimed, the federal courts lack power to fashion common law tort rules in part because "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a [s]tate." 39 But given both Congress's enumerated authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations and its affirmative exercise of that power in a range of statutes, no one could similarly claim that federal courts lacked power to make federal common law rules with respect to international law. 40 Second, as Justice Harlan later noted, Erie required that state law be the governing substantive law in diversity cases because "the scheme of our Constitution envisions an allocation of law-making functions between state and federal legislative processes which is undercut if the federal judiciary can make substantive law affecting state affairs beyond the bounds of congressional legislative powers in this regard." 4 1 But with respect to international and foreign affairs law, the Constitution envisions no similar role for state legislative or judicial process. Federal judicial determination of most questions of custom- 
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bers of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law." 50 Third and finally, the Court cited with approval Judge Jessup's recognition of "the potential dangers were Erie extended to legal problems affecting international relations." 5 ' The Court noted Jessup's concern for maintaining national uniformity in interpretation of legal rules, and his "cautionf] that rules of international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations." 52 Jessup's "basic rationale," the Sabbatino Court concluded, "is equally applicable to the act of state doctrine."
53
The most plausible reading of this language is that the Sabbatino Court simply confirmed Jessup's understanding that "rules of international law should not be left to divergent and.., parochial state interpretations." 4 A fortiori, the same reasoning must be "equally applicable" to interpretation of the act of state doctrine, which the Court had not found to be compelled by customary international law.-s Far from denying the appropriateness of federal courts' making federal common law rules based on their interpretation of international law, Justice Harlan declared it "apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact." 5 6 In the decades since Sabbatino, the Supreme Court has routinely held that a "few areas, involving 'uniquely federal interests,' are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts -so-called 'federal common law."' 57 The Court has However, we are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law. It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R.R. Co. v The proper reading of this doctrine, in my view, is that even after Erie and Sabbatino, federal courts retain legitimate authority to incorporate bona fide rules of customary international law into federal common law. This judicial authority inheres not just in the distinct federal interest in foreign relations, but also in the explicit grant of authority in Article I, Section 8, Clause io of the Constitution to define and fashion federal rules with regard to the law of nations, various other constitutional provisions, 9 and particular federal statutes.
60
Once customary norms have sufficiently crystallized, courts should presumptively incorporate them into federal common law, unless the norms have been ousted as law for the United States by contrary federal directives. S9 See U.S. CONST. art. fI, § 2 ("[The federal] judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority," as well as to various cases involving ambassadors and controversies with "foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."); id. art. 1, § § 2-3 (vesting in the President, a federal entity, certain foreign affairs powers, and directing the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," including, presumably, customary international law); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (" [T] he Laws of the United States," which presumptively include bona fide rules of customary international law, "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby."). With respect to rules affecting foreign commerce, the Foreign Commerce Clause, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, also provides a grant of constitutional authority sufficiently capacious to bring customary international law rules developed in the commercial area within the federal lawmaking power. Cf. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 n.25 (citing many of these same constitutional provisions as "reflecting a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations and indicating a desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions"). For a discussion of the interaction among these provisions, see generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67-77 (i990).
60 Specific federal statutes, such as the ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § i35o (1994) , and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § § x602-z61i (1976), expressly delegate to the federal courts authority to derive federal common law rules from established norms of customary international law. See 28 U.S.C. § 16o5(a)(3) (x994) (abrogating foreign sovereign immunity in any case in which, inter alia, "rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue"). Under each of these statutes, a "national body of federal-court-built law has been held to have been con- (1994) ). Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 426; see Koh, supra note 3o, at 2368 n.i18. 61 For example, contrary norms embodied in the Constitution, federal treaties or statutes, or controlling and valid presidential acts may supersede the application of customary international law rules as law for the United States. My approach differs from Professor Henkin's, inasmuch as I believe that customary international law is federal common law (not simply "like federal common law"). Compare Henkin, supra note 30, at 1561-65, with Koh, supra note 3o, at 2368 n.ai8, 2386. As I understand it, federal judges exercise post-Erie federal common lawmaking authority to incorporate crystallized rules of customary international law into U.S. federal law, 62 Justice O'Connor found "the principles governing this case are common to both international law and federal common law." 63 Similarly, in a string of decisions determining the legal status of submerged offshore areas, the Court has applied customary international law rules to guide its interpretation of federal statutory and treaty provisions. 6 4 Moreover, both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have regularly looked to customary international law rules when applying the felicitously named "Charming Betsy" principle, a canon of statutory construction that directs that "an act of [C]ongress ought never to be construed to violate the law of which are in turn perennially subject to modification by political branch action. One need not enter further into the substantial scholarly debate that has raged over whether the President may or may not violate customary international law on the President's own authority to notice that none of the participants in that debate subscribe to Bradley and Goldsmith's view regarding the domestic status of customary international law. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) , Justice Scalia, writing for four dissenting Justices, found that "the practice of using international law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly established in our jurisprudence," and thus should have barred the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in that case. 64 During the past 40 years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly looked to customary international law to aid its determinations regarding title to lands and islands in "historic waters" off particular state coast lines. See United States v. Alaska, 117 S. Ct. 1888, 1897-99 (1997) (holding under international law that the United States had properly constructed baselines in part of the Beaufort Sea); United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 & n.xo (1992) (considering arguments based on the baseline provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which the United States asserted as customary international law, to determine an executive official's statutory authority to condition a permit); United States v. Louisiana (The Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case), 470 U.S. 93, io6-07 (x985) (applying customary international law to define the term "historic bay" in the z958 Territorial Sea Convention); United States v. Maine (The Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case), 469 U.S. 504, 526 (1985) (holding that Long Island and Block Island Sounds constituted a "juridical bay," and that their waters were therefore internal state waters); United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 202-04 (975) (applying similar reasoning to determine that Alaska's Cook Inlet did not meet the criteria for "historic waters"); United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 1i, 22 (1969) (applying "generally accepted principles of international law" to deny Louisiana's claim of historic title to certain coastal waters); United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 164-65 (1965) (construing the Submerged Lands Act in light of, inter alia, customary international law); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 66-82 (i96o) (holding that Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi were not entitled to a historic seaward boundary greater than three geographical miles from their coastlines). Needless to say, none of these cases could have been uncontroversially decided had the rules of decision been subject to the state law of one of the interested jurisdictions. Cf Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 (comparing " [t] he considerations supporting exclusion of state authority here" to those in an early submerged lands case). These decisions amply illustrate the broader incoherence of the Bradley and Goldsmith approach. For the capacity of the federal courts to incorporate customary international law into federal lawunless ousted by contrary federal directive -is absolutely critical to maintaining the coherence of federal law in areas of international concern. With certain exceptions, placing all international law on a federal, subconstitutional plane gives customary international law a lexical comparability with treaties and statutes, which are superior to state law under the Supremacy Clause. 73 Federal court decisions in the international field thus frequently rely on a blend of federal statutory and treaty interpretation, customary international law, and federal common law to fashion federal rules of decision that are often later formalized in new treaties or statutes.
Applying this authority in First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec),
In the Bancec case, for example, the Court derived a federal rule regarding the piercing of the corporate veil of foreign government entities from federal common law rules, as "necessarily informed both by international law principles and by articulated congressional policies." 7 4 Similarly, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 75 five Justices evaluated the extraterritorial reach of the federal antitrust law 67 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 891-93 (2d Cir. i98i) (finding that under customary international law, Cuba was obligated to pay either "appropriate" or "full" compensation for a taking). 4 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U. S. 6i1, 623 (1983) . Similarly, in the submerged land cases, the Court construed federal legislation respecting ownership of submerged lands in light of complementary rules in treaties regarding the territorial sea and the customary international law of the sea. See cases cited supra note 64.
75 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
in light of the federal common law principle of comity, while four others construed the statute in light of customary international law.
If all of these rules are federal (as the prevailing view suggests), then the uniquely federal area of foreign relations operates on an entirely federal plane, with statutes and treaties providing the positive law framework and federal common law rules (interpreting statutes, treaties, and customary international law) filling the interstices. As Congress and the executive branch exercise their supervisory powers, federal common law doctrine evolves and mutates to reflect the changing face of international law.
Take, for example, the federal doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, which originated in the customary international law doctrine of absolute foreign sovereign immunity. Over time, the Supreme Court incorporated that decision into United States law and melded it with a federal common law doctrine of judicial deference to federal executive suggestions of immunity.
77 Eventually, executive policy brought U.S.
practice into line with the emerging customary international law doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity, 7 8 and Congress codified the new doctrine in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 7 9 whose gaps federal courts have subsequently filled by declaring rules of federal common law. 80 In short, rules that originate in customary interna- 84 Thus, rather than adopting the prevailing view of presumptive incorporation through judicial action, Bradley and Goldsmith would adopt the opposite rule of presumptive ouster absent express political incorporation. As Professor Lessig notes, under Bradley and Goldsmith's highly formal, "strictly positivistic view, the only law is domestic law, and the only domestic law is statute or constitution based; so before international law gets incorporated into a domestic regime, a statute must ratify it." Lessig, supra note 17, at i8io. Were Bradley and Goldsmith's position the law, we would expect to see proliferation of varying state rules of customary international law, or even the total exclusion of such norms from state law. Yet the Constitution created the institutions of federal government precisely to avoid such balkanization of foreign policy and international affairs. In The Federalist No. 8o, Alexander Hamilton expressed concern that the United States might be held internationally responsible for "an unjust sentence against a foreigner" issued by a state court. 8 6 As founders of a fledgling nation broadly subject to the law of nations, the Framers feared that a state court's denial of international justice might inspire the alien's nation to make war on the United States. 7 To avoid that scenario, Hamilton outlined a distinction "between cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations and those which may stand merely 9P the footing of the municipal law." 8 8 "The former kind," he suggested, "may be supposed proper for the federal jurisdiction, the latter for that of the [s]tates." 8 9
History and doctrine thus suggest that the so-called "modern position" extends at least as far back as Alexander Hamilton. Far from being novel, the "modern position" is actually a long-accepted, traditional reading of the federal courts' function. Both before and after Erie, the federal courts issued rulings construing the law of nations. Erie never intended to alter or disrupt that practice, which has continued as the "new" federal common law. The Supreme Court and the lower courts endorsed this view of Erie in Sabbatino and in myriad subsequent decisions. The only question, then, is whether countervailing constitutional concerns regarding separation of powers, federalism, or "democracy" should now force reconsideration of what should correctly be termed the "traditional position." I.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
If customary international law is federal law, Bradley and Goldsmith suggest, "judicial enforcement would seem to raise special sepa- Sabbatino repeatedly emphasized the "proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of the [federal] Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs." 93 But in the next breath, Sabbatino also cautioned that "[t]his decision in no way intimates that the courts of this country are broadly foreclosed from considering questions of international law.1 94 " [T] he greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law," the Court declared, "the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it. . .. "9,5
Thus, when customary international norms are well-defined, the executive branch has regularly urged the federal courts to determine such rules as matters of federal law. 9 to the judicial incorporation of CIL into federal law," 0 2 the Solicitor General called Filartiga "the starting point for the necessary analysis," that is, "a rigorous analysis of a range of factors in order to determine whether an action can be pursued under the Alien Tort Statute for a violation of the law of nations."' 0 3 Rather than declaring modern human rights litigation to be "illegitimate," based on the so-called "new" customary international law, the executive branch expressly acknowledged the court's duty to conduct such litigation by "looking to modern conceptions of customary international law."' 1 4 In short, nothing in the executive branch's approach to recent human rights cases suggests that federal common law rules of customary international law unconstitutionally intrude upon executive prerogative.
Nor do Bradley and Goldsmith explain how treating customary international law as federal common law unconstitutionally invades the legislative prerogative. As noted above, Article I, Section 8, Clause io of the Constitution grants Congress express authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, a power that it has exercised over the.years by enacting a broad range of statutes. 0 5 Much of 98 "[S]uch suits unquestionably implicate foreign policy considerations. But not every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Like many other areas affecting international relations, the protection of fundamental human rights is not committed exclusively to the political branches of government" Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 63o F.2d 876 (2d Cir. i98o) the federal courts' lawmaking in the human rights area represents statutory gap-filling; particularly with respect to statutes such as the ATCA and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).1 0 6 In Filartiga and its progeny, numerous federal courts construed the ATCA to permit aliens to sue foreign officials for acts of torture, summary execution, disappearance, and similar universal crimes committed under color of state law. 10 7 After extensive lobbying by human rights groups, in 1992 Congress finally passed the TVPA, which was designed specifically to supplement and complement, not to narrow, the preexisting scope of the ATCA. 1 8 The TVPA codified and extended to citizen plaintiffs statutory causes of action for torture and summary execution suffered under the actual or apparent authority, or under color of law, of any foreign nation.' 0 9 The TVPA's legislative history expressly declared that "[i]nternational human rights cases predictably raise legal issues -such as interpretations of international law -that are matters of Federal common law and within the particular expertise of Federal courts." 110 Bradley and Goldsmith cite no contrary evidence to suggest that Congress viewed such federal common lawmaking as unconstitutionally infringing upon its legislative prerogatives. To the contrary, their initial article conceded that Congress not only has constitutional power to legislate human rights norms into federal law, but "did precisely this with respect to torture cases when it enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act.""' But in their most recent writing, they reverse course, now reading the TVPA to reflect "a broader and unambiguous pattern In fact, Bradley and Goldsmith's latest position offends legislative prerogatives. After demanding explicit political branch authorization as a precondition to incorporating international law norms, the authors construe two duly enacted statutes in a way that all but negates the political act of incorporation. In the name of judicial restraint, and without any specific evidence of congressional intent, they -read the TVPA -the later, complementary statute -to repeal de facto the ATCA -the earlier, broader statute -with respect to all claims other than torture and summary execution (the two causes of action expressly created by the TVPA).
1 3 Not only do the authors provide no statutory evidence for such an implicit repealer," 4 they rely on speculation about the atmosphere surrounding the legislative process to support their narrow reading of the TVPA." 5 As Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks have recently demonstrated, Congress designed the TVPA to do far more than this minimal task."
6
In enacting this statute, Congress expressly intended both to codify and to extend to citizens the Second Circuit's holding in Filartiga."
7
In so doing, Congress both recognized and approved the federal courts' traditional authority under federal common law to determine whether particular rules have ripened into customary international law." 8 Ironically, Bradley and Goldsmith's approach creates, rather than alleviates, separation of powers concerns. For after demanding that the political branches enact statutes that domesticate international human rights norms, the authors endorse a judicial approach that 112 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 15, at 367 (emphasis added). 113 See id. at 366 ("Congress in the TVPA federalized only prohibitions on torture and extrajudicial killing. Moreover, the TVPA appears in fact to limit the Filartiga approach with respect to these two central and important international law prohibitions.").
114 The Rehnquist Court has repeatedly emphasized the presumption against repeals by implication. See, e.g., Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R_ Co. v No. 102-367, pt. i, at 4 (iggi), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (explaining that the ATCA "should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law" (emphasis added)).
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would read most of two such statutes off the books. They read an act of Congress specifically denominated for the protection of torture victims as mere lip service toward that end. In the face of express, contrary legislative history, they urge judges to use the political "background against which the legislative history of the TVPA must be read" to eviscerate the statute. 119 If this is a plea against judicial activism, it is a very curious one indeed.
IV. FEDERALISM
Bradley and Goldsmith's plea for states' rights strikes an even stranger chord. They argue that the traditional exercise of federal common lawmaking power with regard to customary international rules "portends a dramatic transfer of constitutional authority from the states to the world community and to the federal judiciary.'
'120 But surely, that transfer of authority did not take place recently, at the behest of a few academics, but at the beginning of the Republic, 1 21 from the dictates of the Supreme Court, Congress, and the federal executive branch, the primary beneficiary of this trend.
The trend toward federal supremacy in foreign affairs established at the founding accelerated with the Chinese immigration cases of the late nineteenth century. These cases declared Congress's power to control immigration to be exclusive and inherent in the sovereignty of the United States. 1 29 Amid this historical background, Sabbatino provides the judicial piece of the federal supremacy picture. The decision acknowledged the supremacy of not only Congress and the President, but also federal judges' making common law rules in the area of external relations. The Sabbatino Court found such federal common lawmaking to be justified by explicit constitutional grants and the need to maintain national uniformity in areas of uniquely federal interest.
130
Bradley and Goldsmith challenge this orthodoxy with a peripheral attack on the doctrine of "dormant foreign relations preemption,"' 3 ' as exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision in Zschernig v. Miller.' 32 In Zschernig, the Court invalidated an Oregon "Iron Curtain" statute as an unconstitutional "intrusion by the [s]tate into the field of foreign affairs." 1 33 Justice Stewart's concurrence made clear that the case fell squarely under Sabbatino's rationale. " [T] he conduct of our foreign affairs," he wrote, "is entrusted under the Constitution to the National Government, not to the probate courts of the several States."
34
Zschernig has been appropriately criticized for its failure to delineate clearly when a state's decision has such broad international repercussions that it should be deemed specifically preempted.
35
In the modern era, situations increasingly arise in which state and national governments exercise overlapping authority, the federal government 133 Id. at 432. The Zschernig Court invalidated the Oregon escheat statute, which the Oregon courts had applied to deny inheritance to an East German resident. The Supreme Court struck down the law after examining the ways in which the statute required the local probate court to inquire into the makeup of foreign governments, the administration of foreign law, the veracity of diplomatic statements, and the right to receive funds. See id. at 436.
134 Id. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring). has arguably condoned state action inconsistent with customary norms of international law, or customary international law and state law rules are insufficiently contradictory for a court to give the former preemptive force.
136
Bradley and Goldsmith, however, make two broader claims. First, they suggest that the federal courts' application of customary international law to states "without the filter of constitutional or legislative authorization" is "inconsistent with the Supreme Court's modern federalism jurisprudence." 1 37 But surely nothing in that jurisprudence speaks to "restoring" to the states external foreign affairs powers that were not reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, and several of which -like the treaty, compact, and agreement powers -were specifically removed from the states by other constitutional provisions. 38 Second, the authors claim that the Court's recent decision in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board' 39 demonstrates that the Supreme Court is "back[ing] away" from Zschernig's recognition of federal supremacy in foreign affairs. 140 In Barclays Bank, after several false starts, 14 1 the Court finally upheld California's worldwide combined reporting method for taxing multinational corporations. Noting the wave of foreign protests urging the opposite result, Bradley and Goldsmith optimistically read this decision to hold that all state pronouncements on foreign affairs are presumptively valid, until expressly preempted by a validly enacted federal law.
But the salient fact about Barclays Bank, which Bradley and Goldsmith simply miss, is that the Solicitor General supported California's claim "that the taxes at issue in these cases violated no federal policy and therefore were not unlawfully collected."' 1 42 Thus, the case reveals less about the Supreme Court's view of federalism than about the Court's traditional judicial deference to the executive branch in foreign affairs. 4 3 As the then-Solicitor General put it:
IS INTERNATIONAL LAW REALLY STATE LAW?
[I]n the absence of a dispositive statute or treaty, the courts must respect the judgments of the President regarding matters of foreign policy both where the President has determined that state compliance with an international norm is essential and where he has determined that foreign governments should not be allowed to dictate the practices of the States.
144
Given that neither Congress nor the President asserted that California's taxation policy violated a clear federal policy, the Court declared, "we cannot conclude that 'the foreign policy of the United States -whose nuances ... are much more the province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of this Court -is [so] seriously threatened' by California's practice as to warrant our intervention."
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Only the most wishful thinkers could read this language as some kind of ringing affirmation of states' rights to remake or reject customary international law at will. (1996) (recounting "substantial evidence" that a separate accounting, as opposed to a unitary tax, method of accounting is a rule of customary international law, but conceding that "some evidence ... suggests the United States may be a 'persistent objector' to, and therefore exempt from, this rule"). Therefore, the Court was not obliged to treat the rule of separate accounting as a principle of federal law with preemptive force over California law. 147 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (declaring that neither Congress nor the federal courts has power to declare or review substantive rules of common law applicable in a state). The Framers decided to commit final resolution of constitutional cases to federal judges because they deemed such judges to be "free of the political webs connecting Congress, state legislatures, state courts, and temporary parochial majorities." 149 Yet oddly, on matters of international law that implicate parallel federal interests,' 50 Bradley and Goldsmith would give state judges the last word. "In a case in which no clear state law is on point, as will usually be the case in view of the paucity of state court interpretations of CIL," they argue, "a federal court sitting in diversity would be required to predict how the highest state court would rule regarding CIL's status."'-' The import of this bizarre suggestion is that, before the U.S. ratification of the Genocide Convention, a federal judge, faced with the question whether to apply the rules against genocide in a civil tort suit, would have to predict whether the Supreme Court of Tennessee, for example, would incorporate the universal norm against genocide into Tennessee law. Or federal judges sitting in New York diversity actions filed against Imelda Marcos, Lee Teng-hui, Benjamin Netanyahu, Yasser Arafat, or Pope John Paul TI would have to guess whether the New York Court of Appeals would accord each or all of these defendants head-of-state immunity. REv. 642, 647 (1985) . (1946) (recalling "that spacious era before the Erie case, when federal judges in diversity cases were more than echoes of half-heard whispers of the state tribunals").
153 It is unclear how such a result would promote the presidential "flexibility" in international affairs so emphasized in Bradley and Goldsmith's separation of powers argument. See supra pp. 1841-42. Indeed it was to forestall such results that the Sabbatino Court wrote:
Whatever considerations are thought to predominate, it is plain that the problems involved are uniquely federal in nature. If federal authority, in this instance this Court, orders the national corporations, which must make their business plans based upon the uniformity, predictability, and reliability of judge-made rules. Bradley and Goldsmith reply that "[i]n fact, states rarely consider issues of CIL, and when they do, they tend to adopt a very deferential attitude toward the federal government's views." 15 Yet the claimed urgency of their proposal rests on their prediction that an explosion of "new CIL" will increasingly call upon state courts to make determinations in this area. If, as they say, state courts "tend to adopt" the federal government's views, 5 6 the obvious explanation is that state judges feel bound to follow federal interpretations of customary international law! Significantly, Bradley and Goldsmith cite no examples in which the states have complained about a federal court ruling on international law "invading" their sovereignty. This silence strongly suggests that the states do not need or want (or never understood that they had) the power to determine conclusively international law for the United States. field of judicial competence in this area for the federal courts, and the state courts are left free to formulate their own rules, the purposes behind the doctrine could be as effectively undermined as if there had been no federal pronouncement on the subject. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 434 (964) .
154 In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit held under "principles of international, not merely local, law" that an American bank nationalized in Cuba deserved full compensation for its loss, excluding an award of damages for future earnings. Id. at 888, 892-93. Were this rule not binding on the states as federal law, and if no treaty controlled on the matter, a foreign corporation such as Sony or Royal Dutch Shell would have little certainty regarding whether and to what extent it might be entitled to compensation for a state's interference with its property rights in violation of international law. It was to ensure reciprocal certainty for American corporations that the federal courts have declared, pursuant to the act of state doctrine, a federal common law rule limiting the extraterritorial reach of a foreign government's act of expropriation. Cf Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. io65) ("It would be baffling if a foreign act of state intended to affect property in the United States were ignored on one side of the Hudson but respected on the other; any such diversity between states would needlessly complicate the handling of the foreign relations of the United States."). "unelected federal judges apply customary international law made by the world community at the expense of state prerogatives. In this context, of course, the interests of the states are neither formally nor effectively represented in the lawmaking process.' 160 Again, one might well ask, "So what else is new?" As Professor Neuman has noted, because federal courts have applied customary international law since the beginning of the Republic, "one might think it was rather late to claim that judicial application of customary international law was in principle inconsistent with the American understanding of democracy." 16 1 Moreover, there is absolutely nothing new about unelected judges applying law that was made elsewhere. That is not an indictment but a description of the process of common law judging. 162 Every court in the United States -including the state courts that Bradley and Goldsmith champion -applies law that was not made by its own polity whenever the court's own choice-of-law principles so direct. 163 Nor is there anything inherently undemocratic about judges applying norms of customary law that were made outside the United States. This, too, is something that American judges have done since the beginning of the Republic, whenever they declared rules of customary international law to be part of "general common law."
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In its sixty-year jurisprudence of "new" federal common law, the Su- [s] tate judges that the judges were undemocratically imposing on them norms derived from a remote international community.").
164 Neuman, supra note 17, at 389 ("State judges must have been behaving undemocratically through all the years since 1776 when they were applying international law, whether as 'general common law' or as anything else.").
16S Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (x88) (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 63o, 640 (ig8i)). For discussions of the legitimacy of federal common lawmaking, see, for example, Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law: Sources of Authority and Sources of Rules, 7o TEX. L. REV. 1551, 1571-87 (1992); and Kramer, cited above in note 162, at page 288 note 84. As long as a predicate for uniform federal common law rules can be found in the Constitution or acts of Congress, choosing judge-made federal law over state rules has clear benefits. See Burbank, supra, at 158i (stating that if federal and state law are substantially different, "the costs of applying state law would more often include the possible loss of federal substantive rights and thus justify a conclusion that the federal substantive statute requires the application of uniform federal ... law").
166 See Henkin, supra note 31, at 1561-62 (M.In a real sense federal courtsfind international law rather than make it, ... as is clearly not the case when federal judges make federal common law pursuant to constitutional or legislative delegation."); Koh, supra note 3o, at 2385-86 ("[A]s federal courts have done over the centuries," in such cases, judges "determine whether a clear international consensus has crystallized around a legal norm that protects or bestows rights upon a group of individuals that includes plaintiffs."). In the modern human rights cases, for example, federal courts have regularly demanded that the customary international law norm being invoked be universal, definable, and obligatory before allowing an actionable claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 17, at 495-97 (collecting decisions).
maker of and participant in this practice. Increasingly, multilateral treaty drafting processes and fora such as the United Nations, regional fora, standing and ad hoc intergovernmental organizations, and diplomatic conferences have become the driving forces in the creation and shaping of contemporary international law. 167 In nearly all of these organizations and fora, the United States ranks among the leading participants.
Notwithstanding the executive branch domination of foreign affairs, in every foreign policy decisionmaking process, one can find multiple channels for congressional participation and state representation. These include, but are not limited to, such oversight and input mechanisms as hearings, markups, congressional consultations, committee approval devices, and the like. 16 8 When customary international law rules arise from a treatymaking process, or from a treaty regime, 169 congressional interests are often directly represented at the negotiating table. 70 Even.when Members of Congress are not allowed to participate directly in such treaty negotiations, the knowledge that any negotiated agreement must return to Congress for ratification necessarily pervades the executive branch's negotiating position.
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Bradley and Goldsmith nowhere explain why explicit federal legislation -a process notoriously dominated by committees, strongwilled individuals, collective action problems, and private rentseeking 172 -is invariably more democratic than the judge-driven process they criticize. 173 This story illustrates that federal common law rulemaking in international affairs is a critical element of the process of transnational legai rulemaking, which I have elsewhere called "transnational legal process."' 8 ' In this process, no bright line separates domestic rules of decision (such as the act of state doctrine, which Bradley and Goldsmith acknowledge is federal law) from the rules of customary international law, which the authors would subject to state and political branch supervision. International comity represents a principle with roots in both common law and international law, which now may be evolving into a rule of customary international law. Whether viewed as a rule of statutory construction or justiciability, or a principle of reasonableness, international comity clearly should be treated as a doctrine of federal law, capable of revision by Congress, the executive branch, or the federal courts, as circumstances demand.
18 3 But under Bradley and Goldsmith's reasoning, comity, like the act of state doctrine, could be treated as federal common law only until it ripened into a rule of "new" customary international law, at which point the authors would relegate it to state supervision! Nor is anything unusual, much less conspiratorial, about academics, federal courts, executive officials, Congress, and foreign governments' interacting in a variety of private and public, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, internalize, and ultimately enforce rules of transnational law. To the contrary, it is precisely through this transnational legal process that interlinked rules of domestic and international law develop, and that interlinked processes of domestic and international compliance come about.' i 4
Bradley and Goldsmith view this traditionally fluid, accretive, osmotic process of legal internalization -whereby some rules become international law through treaty, others through custom, and others remain rules of domestic law -as somehow threatening to state interests. Particularly claims of international human rights, they suggest, so invade state prerogatives that such claims should be presumptively barred from domestic law unless formally adopted by express political branch authorization. Under this world view, the time-honored dialogic process, whereby jurists, publicists, and academic commentators (such as the American Law Institute) seek -through writing, teaching, and amicus briefs -to inform, influence, and improve judicial decisionmaking, becomes a shady process of undue influence, "academic flats," and doctrinal bootstrapping. 18 5 This view deems international human rights litigation in U.S. courts illegitimate because the traditional process of fashioning federal common law rules of customary international law "permits federal courts to accomplish through the back door of CIL what the political branches have prohibited through the front door of treaties.' 8 6 In my view, the law is not nearly so mechanistic and the world is not nearly so sinister. Bradley and Goldsmith have stumbled into what Professor Maier once described as the "power struggle image" of state-federal conflict in foreign affairs: "a presently outmoded and ... initially erroneous concept of the states and the national government as competing sovereigns, vying for the right to control the national F.2d 875 (2d Cir. ig8I)). For materials tracing the evolution of the compensation rule in expropriation cases, consult STEINER, VAGTs & KoH, cited above in note 77, at pages 45 1-505. 184 See Koh, Why Nations Obey, supra note iSi, at 2645-59 (illustrating how transnational legal process promotes compliance).
185 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 874-76 (expressing concern about the influence of academics on judges in customary international law cases).
186 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note I5, at 330-31.
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destiny." 1 7 This zero-sum image of state-federal competition leads Bradley and Goldsmith to downplay the multiple channels through which international human rights norms trickle down to the states from the federal government, and whereby states signal their concerns about state prerogatives to the federal entities. 188 It also makes them unduly suspicious of private actors, such as nongovernmental organizations and activists, who play an increasingly important role in any transnational legal process.' 8 9 Like the police chief in Casablanca, Bradley and Goldsmith cannot seriously be "shocked" to find courts looking to academic writing for guidance in international law cases. 190 If anything, the influence of law and economics scholars over American antitrust law has been far more pervasive than the influence of international law scholars on American international human rights jurisprudence, and through similar processes of intellectual influence. Oct. 1998 ) (manuscript at 23-26, on file with author) (expanding on the role of transnational norm entrepreneurs in transnational legal process); Koh, Why Nations Obey, supra note 18r, at 2612 n.53 (discussing that role). 192 For example, Bradley and Goldsmith's curious final footnote points to the fact that several "proponents of the modern position," including me, have lectured to judges about international human rights law over the past few years at the Aspen Institute. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 876 n.365. Yet this observation proves no more than the equally true fact that I lectured on Procedure and International Law to my friend, Professor Goldsmith, when he was a student at Yale Law School. Presumably, the judges in these human the discourse of international law, and through American courts that many of those norms have been substantially advanced.
Whether "old" or "new," international law norms do not bind federal courts until they have ripened into customary law rules. Sometimes, as in the case of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the executive branch takes the lead in incorporating such norms into U.S. law. Sometimes Congress takes the lead, spurred by nongovernmental organizations. 19 In recent human rights cases, federal courts have taken the lead, but only with the express congressional directives in the ATCA and the TVPA.
We should not forget that all three branches of the federal government have a say in deciding whether international human rights cases will proceed to final judgment in U.S. courts. Federal judges need not apply overbroad jurisdictional rules that dismiss all international human rights cases as inherently unfit for domestic adjudication. Instead, they may address the valid concerns that may arise involving comity, separation of powers, and judicial incompetence through "doctrinal targeting": case-by-case application of existing doctrines to particular norms and fact patterns. 199 The executive branch may, and frequently does, appear before the courts to urge particular outcomes in human rights cases. 200 When the executive branch has appeared, it has accepted neither Bradley and Goldsmith's claim about the illegitimacy of such litigation, nor their broader assertion about the nonfederal status of customary international law. Finally, as Judge John M. Walker, Jr. has recently noted:
[The ATCA] is simply an act of Congress. If it raises valid policy concerns and if adjudication under it leads to real-world problems for the executive or the legislature, it may be amended, or even repealed. The fact that Congress has not done so, and, indeed, appears to have endorsed the Filartiga approach in the legislative history of the Torture Victim Protection Act, indicates that the substantial concerns that have been voiced are, at least at this point, largely theoretical. This minimizes any worry that the judiciary, while finding specific authority in a specific Congressional enactment, has somehow embarked on a course of permitting a remedy for human rights violations that Congress never intended, or that will unduly interfere with the functioning of the other branches of government.
1
198 See supra notes 83 (law of the sea), iog (legislation incorporating international law norms at the urging of human rights non-governmental organizations). For a parallel discussion of the respective role of the courts, executive, legislature, and private actors in promoting the pending incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights into United Kingdom law, see Koh, Why Nations Obey, cited above in note i8i, at page 2658. 199 Koh, supra note 3o, at 2382-94 (outlining how judges applying common law and procedural doctrines may dispose of inappropriate human rights cases that may appear on their dockets At the end of the day, Bradley and Goldsmith miss both their large and their small targets. History, doctrine, the Constitution, and "democracy" all fail to support their broader claim that at this late date, customary international law should be ousted from federal law. If their real target is current human rights litigation, that practice also rests on firmly established historical, legislative, and doctrinal footings.
On examination, Bradley and Goldsmith's thesis should lack appeal even for those who fully embrace their values. Treating international law as some species of state law does not foster original intent, states' rights, judicial restraint, executive discretion, or democratic decisionmaking.
When all is said and done, my point is simple: conventional wisdoms are often right. "International law is federal law" is one example. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" is another.
